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CORPORATE LAWLESSNESS: AN ERA OF CORPORATE
IRRESPONSIBILITY MAY BE COMING TO A CLOSE
Kelsey G. Spillers∗
Corporations currently benefit from an “impunity gap”1 in international
law, a loophole that both empowers them to commit crimes and shields them
from punishment. International tribunals created this loophole by limiting
criminal liability to “natural persons,” or human beings. This limitation
excludes corporations, which are classified as “legal persons.” Without the
possibility of retribution, these entities are free to do as they please.2 By
offering their considerable resources and leverage to individuals, corporations
provide the means for these “natural persons” to commit crimes of a magnitude
far greater than would otherwise be possible.3
In a recent ruling, the Appeals Chamber for the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon made a groundbreaking step, laying the foundation for corporate
responsibility in international law. The Chamber found, in The Case Against
New TV S.A.L., that corporations, or “legal persons,” could be prosecuted for
contempt.4 This decision marks a movement away from restricting jurisdiction
in international courts to “natural persons,” a significant advancement towards
closing the “impunity gap” for corporations in international law.
This piece will investigate the significance of this decision in the scope of
international law and the likely consequences with respect to corporate
∗

Executive Articles Editor, Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review; J.D. Candidate,
Emory University School of Law (2016); B.A. Economics, University of Florida. I would like to thank Johan
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1 See, e.g., In the case against New TV S.A.L and Al Khayat, Case No. STL-14-05, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings, para. 14 (Oct. 2, 2014),
available
at
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-14-05/filings-stl-14-05/orders-and-decisions-stl-1405/f0012-ar126-1 [hereinafter New TV Decision on Appeal].
2 This piece does not seek to imply that all corporations are involved with reprehensible acts and notes
that many corporations comply with laws and provide substantial contributions to positive social and global
change. Rather, this piece addresses a gap in accountability for the corporations that do violate laws and cause
harm and proposes the adoption of a bright-line rule that would apply to all corporations to ensure
accountability.
3 See, e.g., STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, art. 25(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998),
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be940a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf [hereinafter ICC Statute]; Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and
International Criminal Liability, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 955, 960 (2008).
4 New TV Decision on Appeal, supra note 1.
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responsibility. The structure of the analysis is as follows: A) a historical
perspective—focusing on examples of corporate involvement in international
crimes; B) the New TV Case and its significance for the future of corporate
responsibility in international law; and C) conclusions.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Corporations have been involved in countless international crimes, acting
with the sort of flippancy that comes with the knowledge that there are no rules
to break. Without means by which they may be held accountable in
international tribunals, these entities have been free to wreak havoc on the
world, as evidenced in the following examples.
In Doe v. Unocal,5 eleven Burmese villagers brought a suit against Unocal,
an oil company, for alleged human rights violations in furtherance of a gas
pipeline project.6 The villagers, representing a class of tens of thousands of
residents of Burma, alleged that Unocal acted through the military and police
forces to use violence to commit a number of atrocious crimes, including:
“forced relocation, forced labor, torture, violence against women, arbitrary
arrest and detention, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, crimes against
humanity, the death of family members, battery, false imprisonment, assault,
negligent hiring, or negligent supervision.”7 Several villagers described the
harsh conditions they endured under the military’s brutal command—
threatened with violence, held against their wills and forced to build the
pipeline with no compensation.8 Testimonies demonstrate that refusal was not
an option—when workers protested or became too feeble to contribute, the
soldiers executed them.9 One villager identified as John Doe I tried to escape
the forced labor program.10 The soldiers allegedly responded by opening fire at
him and, as further retribution, threw his wife and infant child into a fire. 11 His

5

Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
Shanaira Udwadia, Corporate Responsibility for International Human Rights Violations, 13 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L. J. 359, 359 (2004), available at http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~idjlaw/PDF/13-2/132%20Udwadia.pdf.
7 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 920-921 (9th Cir. Cal. 2001).
8 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 939-940 (9th Cir. Cal. 2002); see also Udwadia, supra note 7, at
361.
9 Doe I, 395 F.3d at 939.
10 Id.; see also Udwadia, supra note 6, at 361.
11 Doe I, 395 F.3d at 939; see also Udwadia, supra note 6, at 361.
6
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wife sustained severe burns and injuries.12 Their child died as a result of the
burns.13
Doe’s story is but one of the many tragedies that Unocal facilitated through
its alleged complicity with the Burmese government.14 Though the district
court found that there was evidence Unocal knew of and benefitted from these
crimes, the corporations ultimately evaded court sanctions by reaching an outof-court settlement with the plaintiffs before a jury could be empanelled to
hear a Doe v. Unocal state case.15 This settlement left many with questions—as
a result of the settlement and a previous court order from the Ninth Circuit, the
plaintiffs can never bring a suit on the merits of their claims.16
In Nigeria, two non-governmental organizations17 lodged a complaint to the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights18 concerning violations of
social and economic rights in Nigeria.19 The complaint alleged that the
Nigerian National Petroleum Company, the Nigerian State oil company, had
formed a joint venture with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation. The
complaint further alleged that this petroleum company’s activities had
contaminated the environment and caused health problems among the Ogoni
people.20 The Nigerian government allegedly supported these violations by
providing military personnel to the oil companies and failing to monitor the
companies’ operations.21 The petroleum company’s operations contaminated
the water, soil, and air.22 The complaint alleged that this contamination had
many very serious short and long-term impacts on the health of the local

12

Doe I, 395 F.3d at 939; see also Udwadia, supra note 6, at 361.
Doe I, 395 F.3d at 939; see also Udwadia, supra note 6, at 361.
14 Id.
15 Armin Rosencranz & David Louk, Doe v. Unocal: Holding Corporations Liable for Human Rights
Abuses
on
Their
Watch,
8
CHAP.
L.
REV.
135,
143
(2005)
available
at
http://www.chapmanlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/8-Chap.-L.-Rev.-135.pdf.
16 Id.
17 These organizations were the Social and Economic Rights Action Center from Nigeria and the Center
for Economic and Social Rights.
18 Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. & Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria (SERAC Case), Comm.
No. 155/96, 45 (Afr. Comm’n Hum & Peoples’ Rts 2001), reprinted in AFRICAN
COMM’N ON HUMAN & PEOPLE’S RIGHTS, 15TH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT ANNEX V. (2002).
19 Adefolake Adeyeye, Corporate Responsibility in International Law: Which Way to Go?, 11 SING. Y.B.
INT’L L. 141, 144 (2007).
20 Fons Coomans, The Ogoni Case Before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 52
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 749 (July 2003).
21 Id.
22 See SERAC Case, supra note 18.
13
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people, including “skin infections, gastrointestinal and respiratory ailments, []
increased risk of cancers, and neurological and reproductive problems.”23
After the Nuremburg Tribunal, several corporations were scrutinized for
their assistance in the heinous crimes of WWII. These corporations were
indicted for a variety of crimes including: providing weapons and resources to
further the aggressive war, benefitting significantly from the illegal taking of
plants and private property in occupied countries, providing gas to the
concentrations camps, and employing victims of the forced labor programs and
the concentration camps.24 None of these corporations were held responsible
for their actions.25 For example, in U.S. v. Carl Krauch,26 although the court
acknowledged that the officials of the corporation “act[ed] through the
instrumentality of [the corporation]. . .,”27 it stated clearly that the corporate
entity as such would not be held criminally liable, supporting instead the
principle of individual responsibility established in the Tribunal.28
II. A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
Though it is indisputable that corporations have been involved in many
horrid crimes, the concept of criminal liability for legal persons has been the
object of heated debate in international law. Several reservations have been
presented, including: i) whether punishing corporations for criminal acts also
effectively punishes innocent members of the entity, such as shareholders and
employees;29 ii) conflicts with State sovereignty;30 and iii) the issues that
corporate liability poses, in contrast to individual liability, in international
law.31

23

See The Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. and Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria, Communication
155/96 (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Oct. 27, 2001).
24 Harmen van der Wilt, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes: Exploring the
Possibilities, 12 CH. J. INT’L. L. 43, 52 (2013).
25 See generally UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. CARL KRAUCH ET AL., (The Farben Case), VIII TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10,
NUERNBERG OCTOBER 1946-APRIL 1949 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1952).
26 Id.
27 KRAUCH, supra note 25, at 1085.
28 Id.
29 E.g., Johan D. van der Vyver, The Perpetrator 41 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
30 E.g., Adeyeye, supra note 19, at 152.
31 Id.
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Despite these reservations, the benefits of corporate responsibility are
overwhelming. Some justifications for holding these entities accountable
include: i) when a corporation is involved in a crime, the likelihood of harm is
far greater than when a crime is carried out by individuals alone; ii) the
individual actions of each member might be insufficient to hold them
responsible, despite the collective commission of a large-scale international
crime; iii) an organized form of punishment is necessary to prevent these
collective actions; and iv) there has been increased international demand for
accountability for those organizations that assist in these serious crimes.32
The Appeals Chamber for the Special Tribunal of Lebanon (“STL”), in The
Case Against New TV S.A.L.,, recently found[HELD?] that the Tribunal has
jurisdiction over corporations in contempt cases. While this decision hinges on
liability for offenses against the administration of justice and contempt, rather
than criminal accountability, it is a step in the right direction.
In this case, a corporation was used as a conduit to reveal confidential
information about witnesses in an ongoing trial. Karma Khayat, the organ of
New TV S.A.L and acting on its behalf, ordered a report on “purported
confidential witnesses in [an ongoing case before the STL].”33 This report was
used to create five episodes revealing this confidential information, which
Khayat aired on the corporation’s station and later transferred to New TV
S.A.L.’s website and YouTube.34 The Register of the Tribunal sent Notices of
Cease and Desist to both Khayat and the corporate entity, with an order to
remove the sources exposing the confidential information.35 Khayat
refused36with full knowledge that broadcasting these episodes and
subsequently failing to remove them would “undermine public confidence in
the Tribunal’s ability to protect the confidentiality of information about, or
provided by, witnesses or potential witnesses” and would additionally serve as
a violation of the Order by the Pre-trial Judge.37 A contempt case against
Khayat was expected, but when the Pre-trial Judge added “New TV S.A.L” to
the case, the world was in shock. This decision marked the first time an
international criminal tribunal had granted jurisdiction for a “legal person.”
32

Slye, supra note 3, at 960; van der Vyver, supra note 29, at 43.
In the case against New TV S.A.L and Al Khayat, Case No. STL-14-05, Order in Lieu of an
Indictment (Oct. 2, 2014), available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-14-05/filings-stl-14-05/ordersand-decisions-stl-14-05/f0001-14-05.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See id.
37 Id.
33
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The case hinged on the interpretation of the term “person” in Rule 60bis of
the STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence.38 The Appeals Chamber found that
“the Contempt Judge was mistaken in excluding legal persons from the ambit
of the term ‘person’ in rule 60 bis.”39 Rule 60bis reads, in relevant part:
The Tribunal, in the exercise of its inherent power, may hold in
contempt those who knowingly and [willfully] interfere with its
administration of justice, upon assertion of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
according to the Statute. This includes, but is not limited to, the
power to hold in contempt any person who: [. . .]40

The Appeals Chamber found the term “person” to be ambiguous.41 To
resolve this ambiguity, the Chamber looked to Rule 3(A). Rule 3(A) states that
the Rules must be interpreted “in a manner consonant with the spirit of the
Statute”42 and lists the sources to consider when interpreting the Rules, in order
of precedence:
(i) the principles of interpretation laid down in customary
international law as codified in Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), (ii) international standards
on human rights (iii) the general principles of international criminal
law and procedure, and, as appropriate, (iv) the Lebanese Code of
Criminal Procedure.43

Focusing on the language of Rule 3(A) and the means for interpretation in
the Vienna Conference, the Chamber distinguished between “the letter of the
law”44 and “the spirit of the law.”45 While “the letter of the law” was described
to be a stricter, more literal approach; “the spirit of the law” was characterized
as more liberal, calling for a determination of “the aim and the scope of the
Statute as a whole.”46 Thus, the Chamber considered the aim and scope of the
Rule in its determination.47 Looking first to the ordinary meaning of the term
38

See New TV Decision on Appeal, supra note 1.
Id. at para. 91.
40 Special
Tribunal for Leb., Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r. 60bis(a),
STL/BD/2009/01/Rev.3/Corr.1 (2010) (emphasis added), available at www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/stldocuments/rules-of-procedure-and-evidence/rules-of-procedure-and-evidence [hereinafter STL Rules of
Procedure and Evidence].
41 See, New TV Decision on Appeal, supra note 1, at para. 26.
42 STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 40, at r. 3(A).
43 Id.
44 New TV Decision on Appeal, supra note 1, at para. 27.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See Id.
39
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“person,” it noted that the drafters distinguished between “person” and “natural
person” by including the latter term in the definition of a “victim.”48
The Chamber also looked to international standards on human rights and
general principles of international criminal law and procedure.49 It found an
international trend towards criminal responsibility for legal persons50 and
opined that “corporate criminal liability is on the verge of attaining, at the very
least, the status of a general principle of law applicable under international
law.”51 To reinforce this claim, the Chamber pointed to evidence supporting an
emerging international support for corporate responsibility.52 The Human
Rights Committee noted that corporations should respect international law as
well as the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.53 Additionally,
the Chamber found that corporate accountability had been supported by the
United Nations in various resolutions.54 The Chamber noted that though these
decisions were not binding, corporations are subjects of international law, and
thus criminal regimes would be an applicable remedy.55 In support of this
notion, the Chamber pointed to laws that provided corporate criminal liability
which could be found in a vast number of European States including: Austria,
Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania,
Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom. 56 The Chamber pointed out that
beyond Europe, countries of varied legal cultures recognize criminal liability
for corporations, including: Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, China, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya,
Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, New Zealand, Senegal, South Africa, South
Korea, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and the United States.57 Considering this
evidence, the Chamber reasoned that “it is apparent that in a majority of the
legal systems in the world, corporations are not immune from accountability
merely because they are a legal—and not a natural—person.”58
48 Id. at para. 37; STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 40, at r. 2(A) (defining the term
“victim”).
49 See New TV Decision on Appeal, supra note 1, at paras. 45-67.
50 Id.
51 Id. at para. 67.
52 Id. at 46.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at para. 52.
57 Id. at para. 55.
58 Id. at para. 58.

SPILLERS GALLEYSFINAL

62

5/13/2015 2:25 PM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 2

CONCLUSION
Measures must be taken to eliminate the “impunity gap” for corporations in
international law. With the support of corporate entities who have considerable
resources and leverage, individuals are able to commit international crimes of
far greater gravity than would be feasibly possible as a lone actor. The recent
decision by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is a groundbreaking step towards
this goal of establishing corporate responsibility in international law. With the
cooperation of other international tribunals, corporations will be held
accountable for their criminal actions and an era of corporate lawlessness will
come to an end.

